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GENESIS: INVOLVEMENT: GENERATION

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PREFACE

It is well stated philosophical opinion that 'Philosophy begins in Wonder', and pursuant to this quest is the Socratic Maxim, "Know Thyself". It is toward a malignant growth of this maxim that I tend to argue in this manuscript. The malignancy referred to is Solipsism, which has proven a nemesis for philosophy throughout its history. Specifically, there are three delinations of solipsism that I wish to treat: 'Egoism', 'Metaphysical Solipsism', and 'Epistemological Solipsism'. I shall briefly describe the points of each, their pitfalls and necessities, as they do not appear so 'neat' in the argument of the manuscript.

Perhaps the form closest to the Socratic Maxim, and most re-occurrent in history, is that of 'Egoism': 'Self-seeking'. The incarnations of this form abound in Plato, Descartes, Kant, Hegel, Marx, Nietzsche, and Existentialism to mention but a few. Indeed, it is the fate of the Self, Desein, to seek its ground in a world other than its creation: How true the theme rings in theories of alienation. Its most radical form may well lie in the Teleological Justification, which Descartes preserves from Medieval Philosophy. Here, the ponderous nature of Man, on his condition, receives omniscient approval for the rhetorical, metaphysical gymnastics of Doubt: By far the most fatiguing method of Wonder to preoccupy any concerned Being.

But to be fair to the subject, if not Descartes also, here, we must introduce the 'Metaphysical' and 'Epistemological' notions of solipsism as well. The object of Doubt, better yet of Wonder, is that which in constant examination is tagged 'Reality'; of course the question is, 'Just what is it?' And more important, 'Whose is it?' For it seems Mine alone, that is to the extent that I can ascertain any conclusive verification, Omniscient help not withstanding. But, forlorn am I, for the certainty I seek prohibits certainty. By distain

the objects of my grasp lie inches before my frailing cognition; unable am I to feel any reciprocational unity in the discharge of Being.

In the figurative exposita I have traced the major problems with Solipsism and alluded to some solutions, exhaustive by no means in either case. These problems include: defining Reality, most generally in terms of experience(s); defining Possession, in particular possession of the experience of Reality; accounting for logical coherence in inferences from experiences, and between entities. Ramifications from these few problems can be seen in contemporary philosophy over questions of inference. 'Is inference causality?' 'Does inference give meaning or presuppose meaning?' 'Is it an act of infer?' 'Does certainty reside in inference?' 'Are there other minds with whom a certainty can be congruent?' It is needless to enumerate the entire history of problems and problematic that philosophy has struggled with over the millenniums. However, there appears one central issue in Solipsism that may well seed both the problems and/or solutions to those problems mentioned above.

It seems that central to all issues discussed is the issue of the 'scope of the self', here one must tread very carefully, for we wish to right the 'hanging man'. While the various positions both for and against Solipsism stress an importance to proximity, this is seen in terms of possession - ownership, and it seems that ownership is mutually exclusive: 'The experience is either Mine or Yours, but not both, and anyway, if yours I cannot see, feel, or hear it, so it mustn't exist.' But why does this position continue to raise its ugly head?

It appears that a large chunk of the problem can be attributed to historical problems of 'Dimensionality'. Foremost of these is the notion of extension (external/internal) which accompanies Euclidean perspectives of an absolute

space complete with objects that handle present themselves as 'use options'. Now, where do I own this? It looks as if possession here defines as work - intended and fulfilled to varying degrees: An Act expended. This sounds much like a duration: Time. The other half of the Kantian 'Duo' claims ownership, for the ownership is Mine, after all, I burnt my hand in the candle, yonder. All you can tell is that a blister is raising fast on my palm, from which you allow that indeed I may well be suffering a bit, or so you say. Well, how is it?

Here are present the ironic solutions for the aforementioned issues. I cannot continue on the Solipsism bandwagon, for I have acknowledged, systematically, differences. These differences I have employed to delineate an environment, Horizon, that does not preclude other minds, nor sharing. Given as functional expressions of my 'self' enumerated the questions of possession are an instantiated universe which is pluralistic.

It is this point that I wish to argue as the proper intension behind the Socratic Maxim. The twentieth century in philosophy early on receives the following statement to consider, 'The world is all that is the case'. In my argument I ask, 'What is the case?', and find that it is the engenderment of 'self' as co-extensive: as the world, reality, as Space-Time. In that this is systematic, reflexive asserted, its scope is tautological. This point introduces the junction of solipsism as malignancy and the way out of solipsism, for I do not find the 'case' ready-made in a 'time priori to I', but rather, co-extensively instantiated in an a-volving Space-Time, concatenated as to individual relata.

I find myself called to instantiate the 'I'.